2005 Issue I
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

WYOMING TORT AND INSURANCE
DEFENSE NEWSLETTER

Brought to you as a service of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., Attorneys at Law. 1821 Logan Avenue, P.O. Box 568, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82003-0568. Telephone: (307) 634-2184; Telefax: (307) 634-2199; E-Mail: obk@wyoming.com.


2005 ISSUE II | 2006 ISSUE I | 2006 ISSUE II

ERISA Plan Subrogation Rights. In Administrative Committee of the Wal-Mart Associates Health and Welfare Plan v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 2004), the fiduciary of a health plan brought suit against the plan participant seeking reimbursement of medical expenses under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for amounts the plan paid on behalf of the participant, who was injured in an accident, from the proceeds of the participant’s settlement with the third-party tortfeasor. The ERISA fiduciary sought to enforce the subrogation clause against the participant through imposition of a constructive trust on settlement funds received from the third-party. The 10th Circuit concluded that a plan fiduciary may maintain an action for equitable relief if the plan is seeking to recover funds that are specifically identifiable, belong in good conscious to the fiduciary, and are within the possession and control of the beneficiary. The 10th Circuit ruled that the claim was one seeking equitable relief and thus could be maintained under the ERISA provisions authorizing “appropriate equitable relief.”

Other cases in the 10th Circuit including Wyoming case law further provide that in such circumstances the fiduciary must pay its pro rata share of attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the beneficiary in securing the third-party recovery.

Recreational Safety Act. In Dunbar v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 10th Cir. Docket 03-8057 (121404), the 10th Circuit addressed the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act. Dunbar was skiing at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort when she fell 12 feet into a snowboard half-pipe. She filed suit alleging negligence on the part of the Resort and the trial court granted summary judgment under the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act. The Recreational Safety Act immunizes providers of recreational activities from suits arising out of risks inherent in the activity. Dunbar appealed claiming the inherent risks of skiing do not include falling into a snowboard half-pipe when following the instructions of the Defendant’s employee on how to leave the area.

The 10th Circuit ruled that the intent of the Recreational Safety Act was to limit the duty a provider of recreational sports and activities owes to participants. Recreational activities possess inherent risks of which participants should be aware and for which providers should not be liable. No duty exists for those risks which are “inherent” to a particular activity. The provider of recreational activities does not have to eliminate, alter or control inherent risks. However, the Recreational Safety Act does not bar a cause of action if the injury is caused by some precipitating event that is not an “inherent risk” of the activity.

In this case, Dunbar did not want to engage in activities of the terrain park, specifically the half-pipe. She was trying to leave the terrain park, followed the directions provided her by one of the Defendant’s employees, and fell into the half-pipe. As such, summary judgment should not have been granted.

Underinsured Motorist Benefits. In a recent decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fennema, Docket 28626 (32805), found that an insurance company must show that it was prejudiced by the insured’s breach of a “consent-to-settle provision” before it can be relieved of its obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits. The State Farm policy contained a consent-to-settle provision which denied coverage for an insured who, without State Farm’s written consent, settles with any person for bodily injury or property damage. The insured did not obtain consent before settling his claim and State Farm later denied coverage. The Court found it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the underinsured motorist statute to deny an insured indemnification when the insured’s breach of the consent-to-settle provision had no effect on the insurer’s ability to recover from an insolvent tortfeasor through subrogation.

Compensatory Damages Reduced by HMO Write Off. In Goble v. Frohman, Florida Supreme Court, Docket SC-03-1245 (42805), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that it is proper to set off against a compensatory damage award in a personal injury action the medical bills that were written off by medical providers under their contracts with a health maintenance organization (HMO). In that case the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and medical bills totaled over $500,000. However, under the plaintiff’s HMO program, only $146,000 were actually paid. The plaintiff sued the tortfeasor and was awarded the full amount of his past medical expenses. The defendant filed a motion to reduce the jury award by the amount of the contractual discounts. The Florida Supreme Court stated that the contractual discounts met the Florida statutory definition of “collateral sources” which are subject to a set-off.

There are several states where this proposition has been recognized and several other states where the ability to reduce damages by the amount of write offs has been expressly rejected. To date, this issue has never been squarely addressed under Wyoming law.

MCS 90 Endorsements. In Adams v. Royal Indemnity Company, 99 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1996), Adams was injured in an accident with a semi-tractor and trailer driven by Hofer. After the accident, Adams obtained a default judgment against Hofer of $1 million dollars, but was unable to collect the judgment. Adams then brought suit against Royal Indemnity which had issued two insurance policies. The first Royal policy insured Geigley. Geigley was the lessee of the trailer involved in the accident and Geigley had loaned the trailer to Hofer (for purposes of this newsletter the second policy is not an issue). The United States District Court found that the Royal insurance policy did not provide coverage for the accident.

The 10th Circuit reversed, initially noting that an MCS 90 Endorsement requires liability coverage regardless of whether each motor vehicle is specifically described in a policy. It is designed to require ICC certified motor carriers to insure against public liability for all motor vehicles that are subject to the financial responsibility requirements of the Motor Carrier Act. The Court noted that an MCS 90 Endorsement requiring liability coverage regardless of whether each vehicle is specifically described in the policy abrogated, and thus rendered unenforceable, any limitation of the definition of “insured” in the policy “to one who owned, hired or borrowed only specifically described motor vehicles.” Thus, the endorsement was required to define an “insured” to include permissive users of an automobile owned, hired or borrowed by the insured and eliminated the limiting clause in the trucker’s coverage form that coverage applied only to covered autos described in the policy. In essence, the Court found the MCS 90 Endorsement precluded policies from limiting the definition of “an insured” only to those who owned, hired or borrowed a specifically described vehicle. The driver was thus insured as a permissive user under the policy issued to the lessee, Geigley.

Motor Carrier Logo Liability. In Ross v. Wall Street Systems, 400 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2005), Conway was an owner-operator and under lease to motor carrier Wall Street. Wall Street procured insurance coverage which was confirmed by an MCS 90 Endorsement filed with the Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Ultimately, Wall Street terminated its lease with Conway by sending the required notices, but Wall Street had not retrieved its placards on Conway’s vehicle. The Conway truck was then in an accident which injured plaintiff Ross. Ross sued Wall Street and its insurer claiming “logo liability” from old case law. These old cases basically held that a motor carrier was legally responsible for its lessee’s accidents unless the carrier’s placards (i.e. logo) are removed from the vehicle. The Court held that logo liability was no longer valid law and the letter sent to Conway by Wall Street was sufficient to end the lease. Wall Street was not required to engage in an exhaustive effort to retrieve the placards.

Premises Liability. In Merrill v. Jansma, 86 P.13d 270 (Wyo. 2004), a visitor to a tenant’s apartment brought an action against the landlord after falling in a common area and injuring her shoulder. The Court overruled the prior common law that a landlord owed no duty of care to a tenant or her visitors and held that the Wyoming Residential Rental Property Act (“WRRPA”) would establish the standard of care in such cases. The WRRPA requires landlords to maintain property in a fit and habitable condition and requires landlords to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.

Offers of Judgment. In the Real Estate Pros, P.C. v. Buars, 90 P.3d 110 (Wyo. 2004), a real estate agent and a property seller were involved in a dispute which included the real estate agent’s claim for attorney’s fees. The seller and agent entered into a settlement agreement and a judgment was entered. Thereafter, the agent sought attorney’s fees which the District Court denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees because the offer of judgment that was accepted expressly provided that the “settlement was in full and final satisfaction of all claims,” which would necessarily include attorney’s fees.

FIRM NEWS - Buchhammer and Kehl, P.C., are members of the Defense Research Institute (DRI); Trucking Industry Defense Association (TIDA); Association of Defense Trial Attorneys, (ADTA); Transportation Lawyers Association (TLA); Association of Transportation Law, Logistics and Policy; and the Defense Lawyers Association of Wyoming (DLAW).

The firm of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., is A-V rated by Martindale-Hubbell and we are the Wyoming Law Digest Revisor for Best’s Directory of Recommended Insurance Attorneys.

Our firm website, www.bklawfirm.com. includes information about the firm and our practice, the current Wyoming Tort and Insurance Defense Newsletter, past issues of the Newsletter, and links to many insurance, legal, and litigation resources.


Slips and Falls on Snow and Ice - New Standards. In Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, Wyo. Sup. Ct., Slip Op. 03-234 (November 30, 2004), the Court set forth new law pertaining to slip and falls on snow and ice. Villa slipped and fell on ice on Pinnacle’s sidewalk. There was a city ordinance requiring landowners to maintain sidewalks - i.e., remove snow and ice.

Up to this point, the law had been that a landowner was not liable for injuries resulting from a slip and fall on a “natural accumulation of ice and snow.” Liability would only be found if the owner created an “unnatural accumulation that was substantially different” than would normally occur.

In Pinnacle, the Court noted that for many years the question existed whether a municipal ordinance requiring land owners to remove snow and ice (or maintain sidewalks) could establish a standard of care. In Pinnacle, the Court found that such an ordinance did create a standard of care in such cases. This case changes the law to be applied to slips and falls on snow and ice. The existence of such an ordinance creates a duty to keep sidewalks (and likely parking lots) clear of snow and ice. The Court did state, however, that the defense of an “open and obvious” danger would still apply.

In Wyoming, most cities and towns have ordinances on snow and ice removal and Pinnacle will change the way such cases are evaluated. The prior law will still apply in rural areas since most counties and the state itself do not have snow and ice removal laws.

Comparative Fault and Immune Parties. The Pinnacle Bank case, discussed above, also presented the issue of whether an immune party (a governmental entity) could be placed on the verdict form for an allocation of fault. Several jurisdictions do not permit immune parties to be placed on the verdict form.

After considering the issue, the Court ruled that all actors, regardless of whether or not they are immune, must be placed on the verdict form for an allocation of fault. Immune actors under Wyoming law include governments, employers covered by workers’ compensation, those rendering aid at an accident scene, and others. This case resolves an unknown issue in Wyoming and makes clear that the fault of all actors must be taken into account.

Bad Faith Claims Pre-Empted by ERISA. Claims for bad faith against an employer sponsored benefit plan are pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Court ruled that in the context of employer sponsored plans, ERISA comprehensively regulates those plans and pre-empts any state law relating to such plans. Therefore, bad faith claims against the insurer based on state law must be dismissed. Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Services, 291 F.3rd 1227 (10th Cir. 2002).

Such plans would include health insurance, disability insurance, life insurance, and employer sponsored worker’s compensation plans. ERISA likewise bars suits against the employer who sponsors the plan.

In addition to bad faith, ERISA pre-empts claims based on breach of contract, interference with contract, punitive damages, consequential damages, etc. Damages are limited to the benefits due under the terms of the plan.

Claims based on or arising out of COBRA, which is part of ERISA, are also pre-empted. Smith v. Rogers Galvanizing, 128 F.3rd 1380 (10th Cir. 1997).

To fall within ERISA protection it need only be shown that the employer sponsored plan be: (1) a plan, fund, or program; (2) established or maintained by an employer; and (3) to provide health care, disability or similar benefits to participants. Spina v. Mass. Casualty Co., 256 F.3rd 1006 (10th Cir. 2001).

A Parent Cannot Sign Away Child’s Rights to Sue. In Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3rd 1229 (Colo 2002), the Colorado Supreme Court held a parent cannot release a minor’s prospective negligence claims. In Cooper, a minor was involved in ski racing and his mother signed a liability release. The minor was involved in a ski accident with resulting injuries. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the state has an important interest in protecting minors from his or her thoughtless decisions to release someone from prospective personal injury claims, as well as unwise decisions of his parents who are routinely asked to sign away a minor’s rights.

The Court further held that a third party may not require a parent to indemnify the third party for negligence committed against the child. Other courts have also made similar rulings including courts in Utah and Washington. Wyoming has not specifically ruled on this issue. These rulings could certainly have far reaching consequences in recreational activities and sports.

Punitive Damages and Intoxication. Where a defendant admits liability, the trial court may exclude evidence of the defendant's intoxication. Parker v. Artery, 889 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1995). This same case also says that punitive damages may not be awarded against the estate of a deceased defendant.

Loss of Consortium. Loss of consortium claims are "derivative claims" and are therefore subject to "per person" as opposed to "per occurrence" policy limits. National Farmers Union v. Zuber, 824 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Wyo. 1993); Worman v. Carver, 44 P.3rd 82 (Wyo. 2002). Further, damages for loss of consortium are not recoverable where the claimant's injuries are only monetary (i.e., property damage or loss). Verschoor v. Mountain West, 907 P.2d 1293 (Wyo. 1995).

Workers’ Compensation Liens. If an injured party was covered by workers’ compensation, the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division (“Division”) has a “super lien” in the event the injured employee recovers a settlement from a third party. The Division has a statutory lien on the proceeds of any such settlement or judgment up to the total amount of monies paid to the injured employee. W.S. §27-14-105.

Before offering a settlement to an injured employee, the insurer must notify the Division of the proposed settlement and give the Division 15 days to object. If the Division’s lien is not protected, the Division can assert a claim against the third party insurer for all payments made to the employee. This presents a real risk of an insurer having to pay the same amount twice.

Motor Carriers and Spoilation of Evidence. In Scrimpsher v. Glenn National Carriers, U.S.D.C.- WY, Docket 03-CV-00075, our firm was defending motor carrier, Glenn National. In that case, following an accident the driver’s logs had been misplaced and never located. Plaintiff claimed the Glenn National driver was exceeding his hours of service. Plaintiff attempted to amend the complaint to assert a claim for spoilation of evidence as an independent cause of action. This issue had never been addressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court.

In denying the motion the Court relied on Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3rd 767 (10th Cir. 1999), which found that, based on past cases , the Wyoming courts would not recognize a cause of action for spoilation of evidence. Wyoming courts will only permit a jury instruction in such cases. The instruction provides that the loss or destruction of evidence may permit the jury to draw inference that the lost or destroyed evidence would be unfavorable to the party in possession of the evidence.

Even when evidence has been lost or destroyed, an adverse inference is only permitted if the loss or destruction was in bad faith or intentional. Mere negligence in losing or destroying evidence will not permit a negative inference. Aranburu v. Boeing Company, 112 F.3rd 1398 (10th Cir. 1997); Talmadge v. State Farm, 1997 W.L. 73467 (10th Cir. (Wyo.)). There is no independent cause of action for spoilation of evidence. Even if evidence is lost or destroyed, an adverse inference is only permitted if the loss or destruction was in bad faith or intentional. This applies to all claims of spoilation, not just cases involving motor carriers.

Declaratory Judgment Actions. Where a question pertaining to coverage or the extent of coverage is in issue, an insurer may file a declaratory judgment action against its insured. There is no requirement that the insurer pay its insured's attorney's fees in defending the declaratory judgment action and that absent a specific contractual provision to the contrary, each party will be required to pay its own attorney's fees. Pribble v. State Farm Ins. Co., 933 P.2d 1108 (Wyo. 1997). An insurer does not commit bad faith by filing a declaratory judgment action and conduct by the insurer or insurance counsel in a declaratory judgment action does not constitute bad faith. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v.. University of Wyoming, 850 F.Supp 901 (D. Wyo. 1994).

Motor Carriers - Liability of Transportation Brokers. In Schramm v. Foster, 2004 W.L. 1882629 (D. MD 2004) a shipper hired transportation broker Robinson to arrange transport of milk. Robinson placed the load with motor carrier Groff Brothers. While in Maryland Groff Brother’s driver was in an accident. Several defendants were sued including the transportation broker, Robinson. The claims against Robinson included respondeat superior and negligent hiring. The Court ruled that a broker’s role in arranging transportation does not result in liability under respondeat superior for actions of the motor carrier’s employees. The driver is not the broker’s employee.

However, the Court did find a question of fact on whether the broker negligently hired Groff Brothers based on safety data from the F.M.C.S.A. Case law imposes a duty of care on brokers who select carriers and as such, there was a question of fact if Robinson negligently selected Groff Brothers to transport the milk.

Arbitration. In two recent and separate cases, our firm was representing insurance carriers whose policies contained arbitration provisions. One policy was a private health insurance policy and the other policy was an automobile policy. The actions were pending in federal court and we filed motions to dismiss or stay the respective cases based on the arbitration provisions. The Plaintiffs in both cases opposed arbitration on multiple grounds including policy construction, misrepresentation, bad faith, unfairness, and constitutional issues.

Based on recent Wyoming case law and recent case law from the Tenth Circuit, the district court ordered both cases stayed and both were referred to arbitration. The Court ruled that arbitration provisions are valid and are to be enforced as written. Stewart Title Co. v. Tilden, 64 P.3rd 739 (Wyo. 2003); Gibson v. Wal Mart, 181 F.3rd 1163 (10th Cir. 1999).

FIRM NEWS - Buchhammer and Kehl, P.C., are members of the Defense Research Institute (DRI); Trucking Industry Defense Association (TIDA); Association of Defense Trial Attorneys, (ADTA); Transportation Lawyers Association (TLA); Association of Transportation Law, Logistics and Policy; and the Defense Lawyers Association of Wyoming (DLAW).

The firm of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., is A-V rated by Martaindale-Hubbell and we are the Wyoming Law Digest Revisor for Best’s Directory of Recommended Insurance Attorneys.